As the Myanmar military moves to stage-manage an electoral process, some policymakers appear willing to interpret this as a step toward stability. It is not. Beneath the surface, the Rohingya crisis is not improving—it is mutating into a more complex and potentially more dangerous phase.

A recent policy brief by the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) offers a stark warning: the assumptions that once guided international policy on Myanmar are no longer valid.

The Reality: Fragmentation, Not Transition

The conventional narrative suggests a country inching toward political normalcy. The reality on the ground tells a different story.

Myanmar today is not governed by a single authority. In Rakhine State—the historical homeland of the Rohingya—large areas are no longer under the effective control of the military junta. Instead, they are administered by the Arakan Army, a powerful non-state armed group.

This fragmentation has profound implications. It means there is no single authority capable of guaranteeing safety, rights, or accountability. For the Rohingya, this translates into continued exposure to violence, restrictions, and legal invisibility—now under multiple power structures rather than one.

Yet international policy frameworks still largely treat Naypyidaw as the sole interlocutor. That approach is no longer grounded in reality.

The Law: Strong on Paper, Weak in Practice

On paper, the legal case for accountability is robust.

Proceedings at the International Court of Justice under the Genocide Convention have already established provisional measures requiring Myanmar to prevent further harm and preserve evidence. Parallel efforts at the International Criminal Court aim to hold individuals accountable for crimes against humanity.

But law without enforcement is not justice—it is delay.

Myanmar’s authorities have failed to comply meaningfully with international legal obligations. Investigators remain blocked, violations continue, and the structural drivers of persecution—most notably the denial of Rohingya identity—remain intact.

The result is a widening gap between legal commitments and lived reality.

The Risk: Repatriation Without Rights

Nowhere is this gap more dangerous than in discussions of repatriation.

Regional pressure—particularly on Bangladesh, which hosts over a million Rohingya refugees—has intensified calls for returns to Myanmar. But return without rights is not a solution; it is a recycling of vulnerability.

Safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation requires more than logistical arrangements. It demands:

        • Citizenship and legal recognition
        • Freedom of movement
        • Security guarantees across all areas of return
        • Independent monitoring

None of these conditions currently exist. In a fragmented Rakhine State, it is not even clear who could guarantee them.

Premature repatriation risks institutionalising statelessness and exposing returnees to renewed abuse.

The Region: ASEAN’s Limits and Global Drift

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has struggled to respond effectively. Its principle of non-interference, combined with internal divisions, has limited its ability to influence events on the ground.

Meanwhile, global responses remain fragmented. Western governments emphasise sanctions and legal accountability; regional actors prioritise stability; humanitarian agencies focus on immediate needs.

This lack of coherence has allowed the crisis to drift—managed, but not resolved.

The Illusion of Elections

Against this backdrop, the junta’s proposed elections must be understood for what they are: not a pathway to democracy, but a strategy to repackage military control as civilian governance.

Recognising or engaging with this process as legitimate would not advance peace. It would entrench impunity.

Elections conducted amid exclusion, repression, and ongoing conflict cannot resolve a crisis rooted in identity denial and systemic discrimination.

What Must Change

If the Rohingya crisis is to move toward resolution rather than deeper entrenchment, international policy must shift in three fundamental ways:

First, it must align with reality. This means acknowledging fragmented territorial control and engaging accordingly—without legitimising rights violations by any actor.

Second, it must prioritise rights over expediency. Humanitarian aid and repatriation initiatives cannot substitute for citizenship, protection, and accountability.

Third, it must restore pressure. Legal processes at international courts must be reinforced with coordinated diplomatic and economic measures.

A Crisis Evolving, Not Ending

The Rohingya crisis did not end in 2017. It has evolved—into a system of denial sustained by shifting political and territorial dynamics.

The danger today is not only continued suffering, but strategic miscalculation: the belief that superficial political developments signal meaningful change.

They do not.

Until identity is recognised, rights are restored, and accountability is enforced, “normalisation” in Myanmar will remain what it is now—a dangerous illusion.